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In the absence of a comprehensive reform of the federal immigration system, numerous cities, counties, and local 
governments have passed various local laws and ordinances aimed at addressing the externalities of a growing 
influx of undocumented immigrants. Recently, there has been a proliferation of local ordinances that establish 
licensing schemes intended to prohibit a landlord from leasing his property to individuals who lack proof of 
citizenship or legal immigration status.  Three federal circuit courts have addressed potential preemption issues 
that arise from such ordinances.  Due to the lack of clarity in the U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence within the context of immigration law, the three circuits have split over the validity of these local 
efforts to deny undocumented immigrants the right to basic housing.  While one of the federal circuit courts 
examined in this Note has found such ordinances to not be preempted by federal immigration law, the other 
two courts to consider the issue have reached the opposite conclusion.  In so doing, each federal circuit court 
decision has relied on the ambiguities of the doctrine of preemption to advance or hinder local laws that 
discriminate against undocumented foreigners.  In light of this background, this Note analyzes the 
discriminatory implications of such local immigration laws.  More importantly, this Note proposes an analytical 
framework that will offer a unified, non-discriminatory federal answer concerning the authority of state and 
local governments to adopt laws that encumber undocumented immigrants’ rights to housing.   
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 From Hines v. Davidowitz1 to Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting2 to Arizona v. U.S,3 the federal Supreme 
Court has alternated between requiring express and implicit modes of Congressional preemption when 
examining the validity of state statutes and local ordinances that encroach upon the field of immigration law.  
With very few clear demarcations, such as undocumented immigrant4 registration schemes, the imposition of 
                                                 
* Litigation Associate, Pietrantoni, Méndez & Álvarez LLC.  LL.M., 2014, Columbia Law School; J.D., 2010, University 
of Puerto Rico Law School; B.A., 2007, University of Puerto Rico.  The author would like to thank the editors and staff 
of the Columbia Journal of Race & Law for their valuable edits, suggestions and critical feedback.  
1 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
2 Chamber of Commerce  v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
3 Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
4 Throughout this Note we will abstain from referring to undocumented immigrants or non-citizens as “aliens”.  This is 
based on our understanding that immigration scholarship, legislation and jurisprudence imprudently rely on the term 
“alien” when referring to immigrants.  See Kevin Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 264 (1997).  This term is a social and legal construction 
that institutionalizes the immigrant as an “outsider of the national community.”  Id.   As such, it rationalizes and 
legitimizes discrimination, by justifying a social, legal and political subordination of foreigners, and by employing 
alienage as a proxy for race.  Id. at 269.  From a social vantage point, “[e]ven if they have lived in this country for many 
years, have had children here, and work and have deep community ties in the United States, noncitizens remain aliens, 
an institutionalized “other,” different and apart from ‘us’.”  Id. at 264.  As such, the term strengthens “nativist 
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civil or criminal penalties against the unauthorized employment of non-citizens, and the mandatory 
consultation of federal immigration sources, the doctrine of preemption in the immigration context is in a 
condition of unending flux, leaving the state and local political actors in a position of doctrinal uncertainty.  
The contours of the doctrine remain muddled even after the Court’s most recent pronouncement addressing 
this subject in Arizona v. U.S.  There, the Court seemed to suggest that removal procedures constitute federally 
preempted legislative subjects, but did not provide any clarity as to the actual extent of federal preemption in 
the immigration context.    
  
Against the backdrop of this legal grey area, numerous cities and municipalities across the United States 
have undertaken efforts to curtail the effects of undocumented immigration and in light of the federal 
government’s failure to legislate comprehensive immigration reform.  This Note looks at the recent 
proliferation of local ordinances that establish licensing schemes aimed at prohibiting a landlord from leasing 
his property to individuals who lack proof of citizenship or legal immigration status.5  This new trend in local 
governance has initiated a new chapter in the enactment of legal structures that discriminate against foreigners 
and has contributed to a heated debate concerning the enactment of local laws and ordinances that venture 
into federally preempted legal fields.      
  
Three federal circuit courts have addressed this growing problem by examining different city 
ordinances that prohibit a person from renting a house without first obtaining an occupancy license conditioned 
upon the occupant's citizenship or documented immigration status.6  If an individual does not comply with 
these requirements, criminal sanctions potentially follow. The first court to examine this issue was the Eighth 
Circuit in Keller v. City of Fremont.7  In said opinion, the Eighth Circuit held that federal immigration laws—
specifically, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19868—and regulations did not preempt a city 
                                                 
sentiments” which stigmatize the immigrant as someone “who does not belong” or is “too different” to be part of the 
American polity.  Id. at 265.   
 The use of the term “alien” also has profound legal and political consequences.  Concretely, the word entails a 
bifurcation of rights amongst citizens and foreigners, whereby the latter have less constitutional and legal guarantees in 
comparison to the former.  Id., at 264.  Moreover, it also forecloses the immigrant’s access to the political and electoral 
sphere, by prohibiting the immigrant to vote or run for office.  Id.  It also justifies unequal treatment between citizens 
and foreigners, legitimizing the deportation of immigrants when they have committed certain crimes, but not enforcing 
such a punishment against citizens who engage in the same conduct, for obvious reasons.  Id. at 270-71. 
 Finally, the term “alien” is pejorative in nature.  Popular culture has informed its content with rich imagery that 
synonymizes the word with terms such as “stranger, intruder, interloper, outsider, and barbarian, all terms that suggest 
the need for harsh treatment and self-preservation.”  Id. at 270-71.  “In effect, the term alien serves to dehumanize 
persons.”  Id.  Members of the federal Supreme Court have affirmed this conclusion.  Particularly, Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, when questioned about her practice of using the term “undocumented immigrants” instead of “illegal alien,” 
explained that the latter leads people to “paint those individuals as something less than worthy human beings.”  
Sotomayor: Labeling Illegal Immigrants Criminals Is Insulting, CBS-DC, 
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/02/04/sotomayor-labeling-illegal-immigrants-criminals-is-insulting/ (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2015).   
5 Y. C. Garcia, G. Ortiz, & V. Neave, Where Are the Courts Drawing the Line? The Contours of Preemption and Other 
Constitutional Bases for the Enjoinment of Modern State-Propounded Immigration-Related Statutes and Ordinances, 37 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 81, 96 (2011) (noting that Farmers Branch, Texas; Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Fremont, Nebraska; Escondido, 
California; Valley Park, Missouri; and Cherokee County, Georgia have enacted housing ordinances designed to prevent 
undocumented immigrants from renting or living within their borders.); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between A Rock and A Hard 
Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 60 (2009) 
(indicating that 105 localities in twenty-nine states have enacted laws of this nature.) 
6 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013) (cert. denied, City of Hazleton v. Lozano, Pa. v. Lozano, 
134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014)); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (cert. 
denied, City of Farmers Branch, Texas v. Villas at Parkside Partners, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014)); Keller v. City of Fremont, 
719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013) (cert. denied, Keller v. City of Fremont, Nebraska, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014)). 
7 Keller v. City of Freemont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013). 
8 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. (codified as enacted in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. [hereinafter "IRCA" or "The Act"]). 
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ordinance that made it unlawful for an undocumented immigrant to rent a property without possessing an 
occupancy license, which is only granted to U.S. citizens or documented immigrants.9  The court arrived at its 
conclusion after examining basic principles of the federal preemption doctrine, as well as the latest 
pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States,10 an opinion that addressed the federal 
preemption of certain sections of an Arizona law, commonly referred to as S.B. 1070, which affected 
undocumented immigrants. 
  
Shortly after the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion, the Fifth and Third Circuits took an opposite 
approach, holding city ordinances similar in nature to the one examined in Keller preempted by federal 
immigration law.11  These opinions also analyzed the scope and implications of Arizona v. United States for new 
state and city laws aimed at discriminating against undocumented immigrants through criminalizing efforts that 
affect their basic human needs, such as housing and employment. 
 
 Part I of this Note will survey the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding preemption, extracting 
general principles about the doctrine.  Within this section, this Note will examine these general principles in 
the context of immigration law.  The basis of this Note’s analysis will be the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Arizona v. United States, a case that holds significant implications for the demarcation of the boundaries between 
permissible state regulations of undocumented immigrant issues affecting their communities and the 
constitutional authority of Congress to regulate immigration matters.  
  
Part II of this Note will then examine the three circuit court opinions that have analyzed the specific 
problem of city ordinances that prohibit undocumented immigrants from renting a dwelling place.  The 
examination of these decisions will focus on the similarities and differences between the reasoning employed 
by the federal circuit courts in their vertical relationship with the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements in 
Arizona v. U.S. and previous preemption case law, as well as their horizontal relationship with the other two 
circuit court opinions.    
  
Finally, Part III of this Note will propose an analytical framework that will offer a unified federal 
answer concerning the authority of state and local governments to adopt laws that encumber undocumented 
immigrants’ rights to housing.  This task will be approached from a doctrinal vantage point.  Accordingly, this 
Note proffers a solution limited to the specific context of the field of immigration law by focusing on the 
principles of preemption grounded in the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause case law.  
 
II. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND STATE OR LOCAL ORDINANCES REGULATING 
IMMIGRATION 
 
 In order to understand if federal immigration legislation preempts local housing ordinances impeding 
undocumented immigrants from renting a house, it is imperative to understand the basic principles embodied 
by the doctrine of preemption as applied and developed in the immigration field.  This Part will offer a general 
explanation of these basic principles, followed by a more specific description of how they have been applied 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of local ordinances impinging upon the field of immigration law.  
This Part’s doctrinal analysis will finish with the Supreme Court’s most recent expression on this subject: 
Arizona v. U.S. 
 
A. General Principles Concerning The Doctrine Of Preemption 
 
 Article VI of the federal Constitution establishes that the “Constitution and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the 
                                                 
9 Keller, 719 F.3d at 938. 
10 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492. 
11 See supra note 5.  
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authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”12  This constitutional provision, better 
known in legal scholarship as the Supremacy Clause, provides the basis for the doctrine of preemption.  In 
general terms, the doctrine mandates that a state law or regulation—despite being a valid exercise of a sovereign 
state’s legislative competence—must give way to federal law when it interferes with, or is contrary to, federal 
law.13 
  
Although the general notion holds that federal law controls over state law in the event of a conflict 
between the two,14 preemption doctrine remains a murky and confusing field of American constitutional law 
due to the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a coherent framework for determining when federal law and 
state law conflict.15  The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that its pronouncements in the field of 
preemption are embroiled in a certain degree of uncertainty.  By its own admission, the Court’s precedential 
approach to the doctrine of preemption does not provide “an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive 
constitutional yardstick.  In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula.”16  
  
Despite this apparent doctrinal unintelligibility, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided the basic 
contours of an analytical framework to assist lower courts in the task of determining if a state law has been 
federally preempted.  The starting point of its analysis rests in the settled understanding that “[c]ongressional 
purpose is the ‘ultimate touchstone’ of [the Court’s] inquiry.”17  Moreover, federalism principles have led the 
Court to establish a presumption that in a field traditionally occupied by the states, their historic police powers 
are not to be understood as superseded by federal legislation unless Congress’s purpose is clear and manifest.18  
Such a clear and manifest intent, in turn, can be demonstrated in one of two ways: expressly or impliedly.19  
  
Congress expressly manifests its preemptive intention with respect to a federal statute when it utilizes 
express statutory language to articulate its purpose of trumping any state legislative action that impinges on the 
field or area addressed by the proposed legislation. 20   Absent an express statutory provision indicating 
                                                 
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
13 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993); Grade v. Nat’l. Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n., 505 U.S. 88, 
108 (1992); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982). 
14 CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 90 
(2004). 
15 Id. (citing S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Virtues, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687 (1991)); Viet D. 
Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 178 (2000); Martin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C.-DAVID L. REV. 1, 7 
(2001). 
16 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.   
17 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 
(1992)).  See also Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
18 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
19 Grade, 505 U.S. at 98; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 152-53.  A note of caution is merited.  As professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky has stated, “Congress’s intent, especially as to the scope of preemption, is rarely expressed or clear.  
Therefore, although the Court purports to be finding congressional intent, it often is left to make guesses about purpose 
based on fragments of statutory language, random statement in the legislative history, and the degree of detail of the 
federal regulation.”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 403 (4TH ED. 2011). 
20 See Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 
U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
 As expressed by Professor Lauren Gilbert, in express preemption cases, “the court still must determine the 
scope of what has been preempted.  In so doing, the court focuses principally ‘on the plain wording of the [express 
preemption] clause,’ which is deemed to contain the ‘best evidence' of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’  In express 
preemption cases where the wording is ambiguous, the court has also considered the ‘structure and purpose of the 
statute as a whole . . . as revealed not only in the text, but through [the court’s] reasoned understanding of the way in 
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to [operate]’.”  Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant 
Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of Mcculloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 159 (2012) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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Congress’s intent to preempt state law in a determined field, the possibility still exists that such an intention 
can be implied from Congress’s legislative exercise.21  
 
As provided by the Supreme Court in Grade v. Nat’l. Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n., implied preemption can 
be broken down into two general categories: field preemption and conflict preemption.22  A state law will be 
field preempted when  
 
it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal 
Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a 
‘scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ or 
where an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
of state laws on the same subject’.23  
 
Once again, the Court’s standard lacks “clear criteria for courts to decide [if field preemption is present] . . . 
inevitably [forcing judges to] make a judgment call based on whether the interest behind the federal law will be 
best served by the law being exclusive in a field.”24  Nevertheless, in an effort to offer guidance as to when 
there is field preemption, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has interpreted Supreme Court precedents to 
formulate four criteria that suggest that a federal statute preempts a homologous state regulation. Accordingly, 
an individual must ask: (1) if the area in controversy is one where the federal government traditionally has 
played a unique role; (2) if Congress has expressed an intent in the text of the law or in the legislative history 
to have federal law be exclusive in said area; (3) if allowing state and local regulations in the area risk interfering 
with comprehensive federal regulatory efforts; and (4) if there is an important traditional state or local interest 
served by the law.25  Although providing an answer to these questions is a task fraught with difficulty, these 
criteria provide assistance in establishing the conditions for field preemption. 
  
The final category of the doctrine of preemption is conflict preemption.  This category, which 
constitutes the second manifestation of the implied preemption doctrine, can itself take two different forms.  
In the first, conflict preemption is established when “compliance with both federal and state regulation is a 
physical impossibility.”26  As with previous preemption categories, conflict preemption also poses difficult 
application ambiguities which require judges to exercise judgment in determining if the state law has been 
superseded by the federal legislation in controversy.   
  
                                                 
 An example of an express congressional intent to preempt is found in the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).  Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that the federal statute “shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by the statute.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted that this language constitutes an express intent to federally preempt any analogous state 
legislation.  See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 
(1995).  For other examples of such express preemption, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that 
the Medical Devices Act preempts state tort liability suits); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (holding that 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly preempted state law).  Despite what appears to constitute an express 
preemptive provision, however, thousands of judicial opinions have been written in relation to the preemptive force of 
Section 514(a) of ERISA in varying contexts.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 410-11.  Such a laborious volume of 
judicial interpretation evinces the difficulty of ascertaining an express congressional intent to preempt, even when 
Congress has statutorily manifested its interest to do so. 
21 THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 51 (2008). 
22 Grade, 505 U.S. at 98.  
23 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990), citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
24 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 412. 
25 Id. at 419. 
26 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, a Div. of Brunswick Corp., 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
2015 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 125 
 
Concretely, conflict preemption is clearly present when the federal law and the state law are mutually 
exclusive, leading the federal law to trump the state law because Congress has manifested an implied intent that 
the federal standard be exclusive in reference to state or local laws.27  The fact that state law and federal law are 
different, however, does not necessarily mean that the two legislative pieces cannot coexist.28  When the federal 
law is interpreted to only set the minimum standard—the floor, but not the ceiling—state laws can affect the 
federally legislated area by establishing stricter standards.29  Distinguishing between congressional intent for 
the federal standard to be the exclusive criteria or only the minimum standard is no easy task.  Once more, 
judges will have to draw upon the potentially ambiguous text and legislative history of the statute, as well as 
their judicial experience, to decipher Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent.30 
  
The second form conflict preemption can take provides that a state law is superseded by federal 
legislation if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”31  This type of preemption, which is generally catalogued by legal scholars as obstacle preemption, 
calls “for a more elastic inquiry into the purposes underlying a federal statute and whether a state law interferes 
with the accomplishment of those purposes.”32   
  
As every other category of preemption, this inquiry is brimming with subjectivity and lax discretion, 
since “[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute 
as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”33  In light of such dangers, the Supreme Court 
has begun to curtail its use of implied categories of preemption, manifested in cases such as Wyeth v. Levine34 
and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,35 both of which demonstrate “an increasing reluctance of the Court to find 
implied obstacle preemption.”36 
 
B. The Doctrine Of Preemption In The Context Of Immigration Law 
 
 The federal government has traditionally been recognized as having a preeminent role and a broad 
power to regulate the field of immigration and the status of undocumented immigrants in the United States.37  
This power has been understood to emanate from a comprehensive reading of the federal government’s express 
constitutional powers to establish “a uniform rule of naturalization”,38 and “[t]o regulate commerce with 
                                                 
27 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 420.  
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1983); Midalantic National Bank v. New Jersey 
Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 
(2000).  
30 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 423. 
31 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 54. 
32 Gilbert, supra note 20, at 160. 
 Professor Chemerinsky highlights that judicial discretion is a key element in the identification or not of 
obstacle preemption.  As noted by the professor, “preemption based on state laws interfering with a federal goal turns 
on how the court characterizes federal purpose.  If a court wants to avoid preemption, it can narrowly construe the 
federal objective and interpret the state goal as different from or consistent with the federal purpose.  But if a court 
wants to find preemption, it can broadly view the federal purpose and preempt a vast array of state laws . . . .” 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 427. 
33 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
34 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
35 Chamber of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. 1968 
36 Gilbert, supra note 20, at 161.  
37 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 (1976)); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 377–380 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–420 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 62–68 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).   
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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foreign nations,” 39  and its “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign 
powers.”40 
  
In light of its powers, the federal government enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (“IRCA”),41 a comprehensive framework for the regulation of the field of immigration and naturalization.  
Notwithstanding congressional action, state governments, as sovereigns concerned with the issues brought 
upon them by undocumented immigration, have elaborated local laws aimed at addressing a vast array of issues 
regarding immigration policy.42  Four fundamental Supreme Court decisions—Hines v. Davis,43 De Canas v. 
Bica,44 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, and Arizona v. U.S—offer a doctrinal pattern as to how federal courts 
have tackled any potential conflict begotten by the pervasive federal regulation of the field of immigration and 
homologous legislation enacted by state and local governments.    
 
1. General Principles 
 
 The first of these cases is Hines v. Davidowitz.  In Hines, the Supreme Court analyzed an undocumented 
immigrant registration law enacted by the commonwealth of Pennsylvania.45  The referenced statute required  
 
every . . . [undocumented immigrant] 18 years or over, with certain 
exceptions, to register once each year; . . . pay $1 as an annual registration 
fee; receive an . . . [undocumented immigrant] identification card and carry it 
at all times; show the card whenever it [was] demanded by any police officer 
. . . ; and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to registering a motor 
vehicle in his [or her] name or obtaining a license to operate one.46  
 
If an undocumented immigrant failed to comply with the statute’s registration requirements, they were subject 
to a fine of no more than $100 or imprisonment for not more than sixty days, or both.47  If he or she failed to 
carry the identification card or show it when required, the punishment was a fine of not more than $10, or 
imprisonment for not more than ten days, or both.48   
  
By the time the Supreme Court decided the case, Congress had enacted the Alien Registration Act, 
which imposed further obligations on undocumented immigrants fourteen years of age, such as registration 
and fingerprinting requirements. 49   The federal law, however, was more lenient than its Pennsylvanian 
counterpart.  Pennsylvania’s law made registration mandatory and required undocumented immigrants to carry 
registration cards.  In contrast, the federal law recognized that such requirements had occasioned political 
upheaval in the past50 and did not require undocumented immigrants to carry a registration card to be exhibited 
                                                 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
40 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. 
41 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. (codified as enacted in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. [hereinafter “IRCA” or “The Act”]. 
42 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2013 Immigration Report, Report Highlights, available online at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2013-immigration-report.aspx (“In 2013, lawmakers in 45 states and the 
District of Columbia enacted 184 laws and 253 resolutions related to immigration, for a total of 437.  This is a 64 
percent increase from the 267 laws and resolutions enacted in 2012”). 
43 312 U.S. 52. 
44 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
45 Hines, 312 U.S. at 59. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 59-60. 
48 Id. at 60. 
49 Id. at 60. 
50 Id. at 70 (“Opposition to laws permitting invasion of the personal liberties of law-abiding individuals, or singling out 
[undocumented immigrants] as particularly dangerous and undesirable groups, is deep-seated in this country.  Hostility 
to such legislation in America stems back to our colonial history”). 
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to police or other agents.  Further, under the federal law, only the willful failure to register was made a criminal 
offense punishable with a fine of not more than $1000, imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.51 
 
 The Court, after examining the legislative history of the 1940 Alien Registration Law, as well as the 
long line of national attempts at federally regulating the registration of undocumented immigrants, held that 
Congress’s 1940 Act was driven by a congressional interest of establishing  
 
a standard for [undocumented immigrant] registration in a single integrated 
and all-embracing system in order to obtain the information deemed to be 
desirable in connection with [undocumented immigrants] . . . [while 
guaranteeing the protection of their] personal liberties . . . and [their right to 
be] free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance 
that might . . . affect [the United States’] international relations . . . .52  
 
Accordingly, the Court declared Pennsylvania’s alien registration law to be impliedly preempted53 by the federal 
Alien Registration Act, because it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”54 
 
 After Hines, the U.S. Supreme Court decided De Canas v. Bica.55  In De Canas, the Court examined a 
labor law of the state of California which provided that “[n]o employer [could] knowingly employ an 
[undocumented immigrant] who [was] not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment 
would have [had] an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”56  The Court was called to interpret whether 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as a comprehensive scheme governing all aspects of immigration and 
naturalization, preempted the referenced state law.57 
 
 After stating that California had an economic and social interest in exercising its police power to 
protect local workers against the employment of undocumented immigrants, the federal Supreme Court 
declared that there was no clear or manifest purpose that Congress sought to preempt harmonious state 
regulation touching on non-citizens in general, or the employment of undocumented immigrants in particular.58  
According to the Court, nothing in the text, legislative history, or scope of the comprehensive federal 
immigration scheme indicated the need for exclusivity of federal legislation in this field.59  At best, Congress 
had only expressed “a peripheral concern with [the] employment of [undocumented immigrants]” at that point 
in time.60    
 
 Nevertheless, after De Canas, Congress enacted the IRCA and explicitly addressed the employment of 
undocumented immigrants.61  As it stands today, the federal government’s comprehensive immigration scheme 
prohibits employers from knowingly hiring undocumented immigrants and requires every employer to verify a 
                                                 
51 Id. at 60-61. 
52 Id. at 74. 
53 Interpretation of this phrase has been inconsistent.  See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (relying on American Ins. 
Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419, n. 11 (2003) and Viet D. Dinh’s article, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, supra 
note 15, at 2107, to hold that this phrase was constitutive of field preemption and not conflict preemption); but see  
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 54 (2008) and Kenneth W. Starr, Reflections on Hines v. Davidowitz: The Future of 
Obstacle Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (treating the phrase as the origin of the doctrine of obstacle preemption). 
54 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67-68. 
55 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
56 Id. at 352. 
57 Id. at 353. 
58 Id. at 358. 
59 Id. at 359. 
60 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 360. 
61 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
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prospective employee’s immigration status.62  Moreover, a specific provision in the IRCA now expressly 
preempts civil fines for the employment of unauthorized workers like the one upheld in De Canas.63 
 
 In a third decision published in 2011, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited 
the issue concerning the federal preemption of state laws regulating the employment of undocumented 
immigrants.  Specifically, the Court had to analyze if the Legal Arizona Worker’s Act, which required of licenses 
of any employer who knowingly employed an undocumented immigrant and required all employers to consult 
a federal electronic verification system (E-Verify) to confirm that the workers they employed were authorized 
workers, was federally preempted.64 
 
 One of the IRCA provisions at issue “expressly preempt[ed] ‘any State or local law imposing civil or 
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ[ed], or recruit[ed] or 
refer[ed] for a fee for employment, [undocumented immigrants]’.”65  The central issue in Whiting was whether 
the business license suspension penalty imposed by the Arizona law for an employer’s intentional employment 
of an undocumented immigrant was a licensing law not subject to the IRCA’s express preemption clause, or if 
it was a general law engulfed by the IRCA’s preemptive scope.  
 
 The Arizona scheme required state officials to consult the federal government to confirm an 
employee’s immigration status when a complaint alleging that an employer knowingly hire an undocumented 
immigrant was brought before a state official.66  If the federal government indicated that the employee was an 
undocumented immigrant, the state could commence an action against the employer to suspend its business 
license.67  State officers could only proceed if the federal authorities had confirmed the employee’s immigration 
status.68  Moreover, the state authorities were not authorized to ascertain the employee’s immigration status on 
their own.69 
 
 After examining Arizona’s legal scheme, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the clear language of the 
IRCA’s preemption clause exempted state laws imposing civil or criminal penalties against an employer hiring 
undocumented immigrants, if said laws were licensing statutes or other laws similar in nature.  As interpreted 
by the Court, Arizona’s licensing suspension law was not expressly preempted, since it was a licensing law 
clearly excluded from IRCA’s preemptive reach.70 
 
 The Court based its decision on a textual reading of the IRCA’s preemption clause, relying on an 
analogical definition of the term “license” as defined in the federal Administrative Procedure Act to validate 
Arizona’s broad definition of the mentioned term.71  Arizona’s definition of the term “license” included 
documents such as agency permits, certificates, approvals, registrations, charters, memberships, statutory 
                                                 
62Arizona, 132 U.S. at 2504 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2); 1324a(a)(1)(B), (b); 1324a(e)(4), (f)). 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  Note how Congress exercised its power under Art. I, Sec. 8 of the federal constitution, and 
expressly preempted an area of the law of immigration that the Court interpreted as capable of co-existing with 
homologous state immigration laws.  This shows that if a Court fails to appreciate that Congress had a clear-cut 
preemptive intent, Congress can always enact legislation that expressly preempts the field in controversy.  This approach 
possibly avoids creating a federalism issue that interferes with a state’s sovereignty, in comparison to a Court decision 
that declares a field preempted when Congress did not expressly intend to do so.  Such an approach, however, still 
creates serious uniformity issues and is prone to legitimizing local violations of civil rights.     
64 Id. at 1973. 
65 Id. at 1975 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)) (emphasis in original). 
66 Id. at 1976. 
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exemptions, articles of incorporation, or others forms of permission.72  According to the Court, the fact that 
the Arizona law operated only to suspend and revoke licenses rather than grant them did not change the law’s 
licensing nature.73 
 
 The Court also held that Arizona’s law was also not impliedly preempted, since Congress expressly 
preserved to the states the authority to impose sanctions against employers who hire undocumented immigrants 
through licensing laws in enacting the IRCA.74  Finally, the Court relied on a textual approach to conclude that 
Arizona’s requirement that employers consult the federal government’s E-Verify system was not precluded or 
circumscribed by the pertinent federal statutes.75  
 
 The precedential development of the doctrine of preemption in the field of immigration can be viewed 
as a trend towards the conscious disuse of implied preemptive categories.  Concretely, Whiting seemed to limit 
the preemption of a state law impinging on immigration policy to those occasions when Congress’s preemptive 
intent is clearly espoused in the pertinent federal immigration legislation. This conclusion, however, would 
soon be tested by a 2012 Supreme Court decision revisiting the subject.        
 
2. Arizona v. U.S. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s most recent expression concerning the federal preemption of state or local 
government legislation impinging upon the field of immigration is found in Arizona v. U.S., a facial challenge 
brought by the United States’ government against Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, better known as S.B. 1070.76  S.B. 1070 constituted Arizona’s attempt to “discourage and 
deter the unlawful entry and presence of [undocumented immigrants] and economic activity by persons 
unlawfully present in the United States.”77  
 
 The U.S. government contended that federal law preempted four provisions of S.B. 1070.78  Two of 
these provisions created new state offenses.79  Particularly, Section 3 penalized an undocumented immigrant’s 
failure to comply with federal non-citizen registration requirements, 80  while Section 5(C) prohibited an 
undocumented immigrant from seeking or engaging in work in the state of Arizona.81   
 
 The last two provisions challenged by the United States empowered state and local officials to arrest 
and investigate undocumented immigrants.82  Section 6 authorized “officers to arrest without a warrant a 
person [they had] ‘probable cause to believe … [had] committed any public offence that [made] the person 
removable from the United States’.”83  The final provision, Section 2(B), mandated that state and local officers 
who conducted a stop, detention, or arrest had to “make efforts to verify the [detainee’s] immigration status 
with the Federal Government.”84  In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Sections 3, 5(C) and 6 of 
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73 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1979. 
74 Id. at 1984-85. 
75 Id. at 1985-86. 
76 Id. at 2497  
77 Note following Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (West 2012), as cited in Id.   
78 Arizona, 132 U.S. at 2497-98.  
79 Id. at 2497. 
80 Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (West Supp. 2011)).  
81 Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (West Supp. 2011)). 
82 Id. at 2498. 
83 Id. at 2498 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (West Supp. 2011)). 
84 Id. at 2498 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West Supp. 2012)). 
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S.B. 1070 were federally preempted.85  The Court declined to enjoin Section 2(B), however, instead giving 
Arizona state courts the opportunity to interpret its scope in an as-applied challenge.86   
 
 Section 3 of S.B. 1070 penalized an undocumented immigrant’s failure to complete or carry a non-
citizen registration document.87  As a peculiar feature, the Arizona law defined the proscribed conduct in 
reference to the IRCA.88  The federal Supreme Court analyzed the IRCA’s current non-citizen registration 
regime and held that, despite its differences from the system analyzed in Hines, the scheme was comprehensive 
in nature and designed as a harmonious whole.89  As such, Arizona’s undocumented immigrant registration 
statute was field preempted because it impinged upon the federal government’s carefully exercised discretion 
as to how and when to prosecute and penalize an undocumented immigrant who failed to register according 
to federal law.90  Applying Hines, the Court held that the IRCA foreclosed Section 3, even if the state law sought 
to complement or enforce additional or auxiliary immigration measures.91 
 
 The second provision examined by the Court, Section 5(C), made it a state misdemeanor for an 
undocumented immigrant to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an 
employee or independent contractor in Arizona.92  Any undocumented immigrant who violated this provision 
was subject to a $2,500 fine and incarceration for up to six months.93 
 
 The Court began its analysis of Section 5(C) by restating that after De Canas, the enactment of the 
IRCA comprehensively proscribed the hiring of undocumented immigrants.94  The legislative history of the 
IRCA, however, clearly manifested a congressional intent to not criminally penalize undocumented immigrants 
who seek employment, because such an approach would be contrary to the federal objective of avoiding 
criminalization of non-citizens who risked being exploited by their employers.95  Although the IRCA’s express 
preemption clause was silent as to whether a state could criminally penalize an employee, the Court understood 
that Section 5(C) was conflict preempted because it established a criminal enforcement mechanism against 
undocumented immigrants seeking unauthorized employment, which disrupted the congressional policy as 
manifested in the text, structure and history of the IRCA of not criminalizing such employees.96            
 
 The Court then considered Section 6 of S.B. 1070, which provided that a state officer, without a 
warrant, had the authority to arrest a person if the officer had probable cause to believe that the person had 
committed any public offense that would have made him removable from the United States.97  The Court 
interpreted this provision as conferring state officers a greater discretion to arrest undocumented immigrants 
on the basis of removability than Congress had given to trained federal immigration officers.98  The Court 
noted that the federal decision to arrest an undocumented immigrant as a prelude to a potential removal from 
the United States is guided by a number of factors ordained by the federal statutory structure, and exercised 
carefully in light of the risks that such a decision poses to the United States’ foreign relations.99  Section 6, by 
empowering local officers to arrest an individual in response to his or her potential removability, impinged 
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upon a decisional subject entrusted exclusively to the federal government, in consideration of the political and 
economic consequences that such a decision entails in the United States’ relationship with foreign powers.  
Accordingly, the Court found Section 6 to be conflict preempted because it created an obstacle to the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress regarding the removal of an undocumented immigrant.100  
 
 Finally, the Court examined Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, which required state officers to make a 
reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person they detained or arrested on some other 
legitimate basis, if the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the detainee was an undocumented 
immigrant.101  The immigration status of the person would be obtained by consulting the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agency (hereinafter, “ICE”).102 
 
 The Court concluded that the IRCA did not preclude a state law that required state officers to consult 
ICE as to the immigration status of a detained individual. 103   Instead, Congress explicitly encouraged 
communications between state officers and the federal government concerning the immigration status of an 
undocumented immigrant.104  Hence, the Court concluded that Section 2(B) was not conflict preempted in this 
regard.105  
 
 Nevertheless, those who challenged S.B. 1070 also argued that Section 2(B) posed an obstacle to the 
federal immigration framework because state officers would be required to delay the release of some detainees 
for no reason other than to verify their immigration status.106  The Court understood, however, that courts 
could construe Section 2(B) in ways that avoided these concerns, by limiting its reach to only requiring state 
officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee is 
released.107  Considering that further state judicial interpretation was needed in order to understand what 
Section 2(B) meant and how it would be enforced, the Court abstained from holding said provision conflict 
preempted until an as applied challenge was presented.108  
 
 Arizona represents a departure from the Court’s previous doctrinal approach in the subject of federal 
preemption of state immigration laws, halting the turn that began in Whiting towards understanding 
Congressional preemptive intent solely by reference to the text of the IRCA.  The emphasis placed on the 
presumption that state laws should not be preempted unless Congress has expressed a clear and manifest intent 
to do so was stymied by a new configuration of the Court.   
 
 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor—dissenters in Whiting—joined Justice Kennedy and Chief 
Justice Roberts—author of Whiting’s majority opinion—in a decision that reinstituted the Court’s approach in 
Hines, whereby implied categories of preemption are judicial vehicles that stifle local immigration policy in favor 
of a centralized, federal approach to immigration.  The Justices who had formed part of the majority opinion 
in Whiting—Scalia, Thomas and Alito—are now a minority arguing in favor of state sovereignty and a rejection 
of implied methods of preemption. 
 
 Whiting and Arizona create a zone of ambiguity as to the Court’s position in the explicit versus implied 
preemption spectrum, leaving only a degree of certainty as to traditional demarcations between federal and 
state authority in the elaboration of immigration policy.  These cases retain just three demarcations developed 
through decades of Supreme Court doctrine: (1) the impossibility of a state enacting legislation that affects the 
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field of undocumented immigrant registration, provided that the federal government continues to preserve a 
harmonious and all-encompassing legislative scheme that addresses the subject of undocumented immigrant 
registration; (2) an express preemption of a state’s ability to impose civil or criminal penalties against the 
unauthorized employment of undocumented immigrants, unless such penalties are imposed through licensing 
laws similar to those examined in Whiting; and, (3) the potential for co-existence between the federal 
immigration structure and state or local laws that mandate the consultation of federal sources (e.g. ICE’s Law 
Enforcement Support Center or E-Verify) to ascertain a non-citizen’s immigration status. 
 
 Arizona adds two elements which are crucial for the housing ordinances the next part of this Note will 
examine.  First, the Court’s determination to find Section 6 conflict preempted, and thereby foreclose any state 
legislation empowering state officials to conduct warrantless arrests of undocumented immigrants based solely 
on their potential removability, institutes a budding Hines-like demarcation regarding removal procedures.  
Pointedly, Arizona hints that any state legislation that adversely encroaches upon the federal government’s 
discretion to arrest, prosecute, or initiate a removal procedure, will be deemed to be in conflict with the federal 
removal structure, which pursues particular national interests and objectives in the United States’ relationship 
with foreign powers.  Only an express legislative conferral of authority to state governments or a clear indication 
that Congress did not seek federal exclusivity in a given removal policy will avoid preemption.  In a sense, the 
presumption against preemption of state legislation in immigration matters has been rebutted in favor of a 
Hines-like understanding that removal is an area within the exclusive competence of the federal government. 
 
 Secondly, the Court’s conclusion in Arizona that Section 2(B) would be better addressed through an 
as-applied challenge that gave state courts an opportunity to interpret the scope of a state immigration law that 
textually seems to not encroach on the federal immigration scheme.  This raises potentially serious conflict-
preemption concerns in the application realm and opens the doors to greater degrees of uncertainty as to the 
boundaries of the preemption doctrine, since as-applied challenges of dubious state laws are varied in 
possibility. 
 
 It is against this uncertain doctrinal backdrop that the federal circuit courts have had to address state 
and local laws prohibiting landlords from renting a dwelling place to an undocumented immigrant, or that 
require non-citizens to present proof of residency or citizenship as a condition to receive a renting license.  The 
following part will briefly describe how these ordinances have proliferated throughout the state legislative 
canvas, concluding with an examination of a recent circuit split that brings to the fore the indeterminacy that 
plagues the doctrine of preemption within the context of immigration.   
 
III. DIFFERING VIEWS CONCERNING THE PREEMPTION OF CITY HOUSING ORDINANCES: 
EXAMINING THE EIGHTH, FIFTH AND THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS  
 
A. A Trend Towards The Localization Of Immigration In The Housing Context 
 
 In response to the federal government’s failure to reform the nation’s immigration laws in light of 
modern demographic developments, state and local governments have adopted laws and ordinances aimed at 
addressing the social, economic, and security concerns that stem from undocumented immigration. 109  
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, in 2013, lawmakers in forty-five states and the 
District of Columbia enacted 184 laws and 253 resolutions related to immigration.110  These legislative efforts 
accounted for a sixty-four percent increase from the 267 laws and resolutions enacted in 2012.111  Their content 
addresses a multiplicity of subjects: they create immigration enforcement schemes; define new state 
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immigration crimes; promote English-only policies; regulate housing;112 condition unauthorized employment 
of undocumented immigrants; require registration of non-citizens; and regulate welfare and public health 
benefits available to immigrants.113 
 
In recent years local laws concerned with the regulation of housing have surged in numbers.114  Cities, 
counties, and municipalities such as Farmers Branch, Texas; Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Fremont, Nebraska; 
Escondido, California; Valley Park, Missouri; and Cherokee County, Georgia, have all adopted such 
ordinances. 115   In general terms, the ordinances follow a pattern of creating “the offense of ‘harboring 
[undocumented immigrants]’ for providing housing to [non-citizens] knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact 
of [their undocumented immigrant] status . . . [and further require] tenants to obtain occupancy permits upon 
proof of, among other things, ‘legal citizenship and/or residency’.”116 
 
The following section will focus on three federal circuit court opinions motivated by the housing 
ordinances adopted by three of these cities: Fremont, Nebraska; Farmers Branch, Texas; and Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania.  After discussing the legal reasoning behind these decisions, this Note will highlight how the 
doctrine of preemption, among other legal practices, may be employed to further or hinder the discriminatory 
implications of these ordinances. 
 
B. Keller v. City of Fremont 
 
 The first court to examine the legal implications of the housing ordinances previously described was 
the Eight Circuit in Keller v. City of Fremont.117  Keller dealt with a 2010 city ordinance adopted by voters in 
Fremont, Nebraska which limits hiring and providing rental housing to “illegal aliens” and “unauthorized 
aliens,”118 as defined in the ordinance. 119  A group of landlords, tenants, and employers, facially challenged the 
ordinance in federal court, on the grounds that: (1) the ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated the 
Equal Protection, Due Process, and Commerce Clauses of the United States’ Constitution; (2) it was federally 
preempted under the IRCA;120 and (3) it violated various state and federal laws.121 
 
 After the lower federal court issued its decision, the parties appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit.122  
As explained by the Eighth Circuit, “[t]hese provisions [made] it unlawful for any person or business entity to 
rent to, or permit occupancy by, ‘an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has 
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law’.”123  The term “illegal alien” was defined 
as “an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States”, in reference to the IRCA.124  Moreover, before 
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the city government could conclude that an individual was an “illegal alien”, its representatives had to consult 
the federal government to verify the individual’s legal status.125   
 
 The provisions further required that, with certain exceptions, every prospective renter over the age of 
eighteen had to obtain an occupancy license issued by the local government, and every landlord had to obtain 
a copy of the renter’s license as a condition to signing the lease contract.126   After an occupancy license was 
issued, the Fremont City Police Department would consult the federal government to determine if the 
individual was an “illegal alien.”127  If the federal government determined that the individual was not a “legal 
resident” or a citizen of the United States, the local police would notify the renter and the landlord of the 
federal government’s determination and would grant them a period to establish the renter’s legal status as an 
immigrant in the United States.128  If the individual failed to prove his lawful stay in the United States, his 
license would be revoked and both the landlord and the renter would be fined $100 a day.129  The affected 
renter and landlord would then have an opportunity to seek administrative and judicial review.130  
 
 The circuit court examined the district court’s determination that, although the requirement of 
information as to the renter’s legal status and the subsequent verification of that information with the federal 
authorities was not preempted by federal law, the ordinance’s imposition of penalties for what equated to be a 
prohibition of harboring undocumented immigrants, was conflict preempted by the IRCA.131  After examining 
Arizona v. U.S., the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination.132  
 
 First, the court understood that Congress had made no pronouncement in IRCA that constituted an 
exercise of express preemption. Second, and after interpreting DeCanas v. Bicas, the Eighth Circuit held that city 
ordinances such as the one at issue were not field preempted by federal law because they were only designed 
to deter, or even prohibit, undocumented immigrants from residing within a particular locality, and were not 
tantamount to immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in the country.133  The court further 
held that, as long as the state laws do not attempt to remove the undocumented immigrant from the United 
States, states have an economic and social interest in deterring undocumented immigrants from entering their 
state in violation of federal law.134  
 
 The court’s opinion also sustained that the state’s occupancy license were nothing like the registration 
laws held preempted in Arizona v. U.S.  The Eighth Circuit arrived at its conclusion by interpreting that the 
occupancy license scheme in dispute, different from the registration laws held preempted in the past by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, required information from all renters—non-citizens and citizens alike—without requiring 
information only from undocumented immigrants, or even non-renting undocumented immigrants.135   
  
Finally, the court also rejected other possibilities of implicit field preemption in relation to the IRCA 
sections that regulate the harboring of undocumented immigrants. 136   Said provisions “impose criminal 
penalties on any person who ‘knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or 
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remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection . . . such alien in 
any place, including any building or any means of transportation.”137  
  
Employing an approach to preemption similar to the Supreme Court’s approach in De Canas and 
Whiting, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the presupposition that no state law will be held preempted unless 
Congress clearly manifests an intention to preempt state authority to regulate in a manner consistent with 
federal law.138  Accordingly, the court held that if Congress wanted to preempt local anti-harboring laws, it 
should do so expressly,139 or by instituting a pervasive framework of anti-harboring regulation.  Interpreting 
that that was not the case with the IRCA’s anti-harboring provision, the Eighth Circuit understood that states 
and local governments could enact laws aimed at supplementing federal legislation in this area.140  
  
Furthermore, the court held that the Fremont ordinance did not conflict with the IRCA anti-harboring 
provision just because it defined the word “harboring” more expansively or imposed penalties not 
contemplated by the federal statute.141  In order to distinguish the Fremont ordinance from Section 5(C) of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the court limited itself to saying that the Arizona provision was focused on enforcing the 
federal anti-harboring provision, while the Fremont disposition only prohibited “harboring conduct that is 
inconsistent with the City’s local public interests.”142  According to the Eighth Circuit, Congress did not intend 
“to preempt States and local governments from imposing different penalties for the violation of different state 
or local prohibitions simply because the prohibited conduct was labeled ‘harboring.’”143  
  
The Eighth Circuit next addressed whether the ordinance was conflict preempted due to the possibility 
that it stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress 
in providing exclusive federal procedures for removing undocumented immigrants according to the IRCA.144  
The plaintiffs argued that the Fremont City ordinance scheme would interfere with the federal government’s 
intervention with undocumented immigrants for their subsequent removal by forcing undocumented 
immigrants to leave the city after the federal government had already determined their location but was in the 
process of determining how it would intervene with these immigrants.145 
  
The Eighth Circuit rejected these contentions.  If the Fremont ordinances amounted to a de facto 
removal, the court held, then the state statutes upheld in De Canas and Whiting should have also been held 
preempted.  In the Eighth Circuit’s view, the laws at issue in De Canas and Whiting would have also indirectly 
driven undocumented immigrants out of the state, obscuring their location for federal law enforcement 
purposes.146  As such tangential concerns had previously been rejected by the Supreme Court, the Eighth 
Circuit declined to accept the plaintiff’s reasoning.  
  
The Eighth Circuit also grounded its decision in Arizona v. U.S.  Specifically, it distinguished the 
Fremont ordinance from one of the provisions held preempted in Arizona, Section 6.  According to the court, 
Section 6 required the local Arizona officials to independently determine if the immigrant was removable from 
the U.S., and to take action accordingly.  The Fremont ordinance, on the other hand, did not authorize state 
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officials to remove undocumented persons from the city, only empowering them to fine and revoke occupancy 
licenses for those without documentation.147  Since the state provisions in question did not “remove” any 
undocumented immigrant from the United States (or even from the city), federal immigration officials retained 
complete discretion to decide whether and when to pursue removal proceedings.148  Such a scheme, the court 
concluded, mirrored the system validated in Whiting by the Supreme Court.149  
 
 Finally, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims that the city ordinance would affect the federal 
removal procedure by forcing undocumented immigrants outside of the city and thereby upsetting the 
knowledge of their location for removal purposes, was a claim not fit for a facial challenge.150  Analogizing to 
Arizona, the court focused on the only provision of S.B. 1070 that was not held preempted by the Supreme 
Court: Section 2(B).151  The Supreme Court in Arizona held that said provision could not be declared conflict 
preempted because there was a basic uncertainty about what the local law meant and how it would be enforced; 
hence, at the stage of a facial challenge, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, 
it would have been inappropriate to assume that the provision in question would be construed in a way that 
created a conflict with federal law.152  Employing the same reasoning, the Eighth Circuit held that it was 
too early to declare the rental provisions conflict preempted, choosing to wait for an as applied challenge to 
gauge how the state authorities would enforce and interpret its rental provisions.153   
 
C. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Framers Branch 
 
 Shortly after the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion, the Fifth Circuit was asked to decide a similar 
question on nearly identical facts in Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch.154  The case arose from 
the city of Farmer’s Branch, Texas, which passed an ordinance that required every individual who rented an 
apartment or a single-family unit to obtain an occupancy license.155  Once the license was obtained, the local 
authorities would consult the federal authorities as to the individual’s immigration status.156  If the federal 
authorities held twice that the individual was an undocumented immigrant, the city inspector would revoke the 
individual’s license, as well as the landlord’s renting license. 
  
The city ordinance also included seven offenses related to the renting of a dwelling place to or by an 
undocumented immigrant: (1) renting a dwelling place without a license; (2) making a false statement when 
applying for a license; (3) renting a residence without obtaining licenses from the occupants; (4) failing to 
maintain copies from all known occupants; (5) failing to include a provision in the lease indicating that 
occupancy by a person without a license equates to a default; (6) allowing an occupant to inhabit a residence 
without a valid license; and (7) knowingly permitting an occupant to lease a property without a license.157  Any 
transgressor would be fined up to $500 for each breach.158  In addition, violators could be fined for every day 
that one of these offenses remained without rectification.159 
  
Despite the similarities between the Farmer’s Branch ordinance and the Fremont ordinance, the Fifth 
Circuit found the Farmer’s Branch ordinance to be conflict preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
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Constitution.160  In direct opposition to the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas occupancy 
license scheme’s criminal provisions conflicted with the IRCA’s statute criminalizing the harboring of 
undocumented immigrants as well as its scheme to remove these individuals from the U.S.161  The court found 
that the ordinance disrupted the federal government’s discretion as to when and how to prosecute and bring 
to fulfillment a removal procedure.162    
  
The court also found a conflict between the ordinance and the IRCA since the ordinance granted state 
officials authority to act as immigration officers outside the “limited circumstances” specified by federal law.163  
The court further reasoned that federal law did not criminalize an undocumented immigrant’s rental of a home 
without a license, and that the city ordinance, when it instructed arrests for a violation of its provisions, was 
creating a new category of undocumented immigrant status not contemplated by federal law, thus affecting the 
IRCA’s carefully structured removal scheme.164  Furthermore, unlike the state provisions validated in De Canas 
and Whiting, the Farmer’s Branch ordinance’s scope also affected non-citizens who may not have lawful status 
but face no federal exclusion from rental housing, exposing these individuals to arrests, detentions and 
prosecutions based on the local government’s assessment of their “unlawful presence,” without federal 
direction or supervision.165    
  
In the end, the court found that the city ordinance allowed a state to do what the Supreme Court 
prohibited in Arizona: make an initial determination of the lawful status of an undocumented immigrant without 
the required intervention of the federal government.166  The Fifth Circuit rested its conclusion on the testimony 
of local officials and federal immigration officers, who all conceded that the verification of the undocumented 
immigrant’s status with the federal immigration authorities did not provide enough information about the 
immigrant’s “legal presence in the United States,” which is determined through a “labyrinth of [federal 
immigration] statutes and regulations governing the classification of non-citizens.”167  As such, a local officer 
would have to make an independent determination as to the lawfulness of the immigrant’s stay.168 
  
The ordinance examined by the Fifth Circuit bore one key difference from the Fremont ordinance: it 
allowed local officials to arrest undocumented immigrants believed to be illegally staying in the U.S. if they were 
unable to prove that they were citizens or legal residents of the U.S.  The Fifth Circuit analogized the city 
ordinance to Section 6 of S.B. 1070, held preempted in Arizona (Section 6), to determine that the city ordinance 
was federally preempted because it violated the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the federal 
government.169  According to the court, the Farmer’s Branch ordinance was even more in conflict with the 
federal immigration scheme than Section 6 of S.B. 1070 because it did not limit the state officers to arresting 
an undocumented immigrant they suspected to not be lawfully present in the U.S. with the intention of later 
referring him to the pertinent federal authorities. Instead, it empowered state officers to arrest, prosecute and 
sentence an individual beyond the federal government’s supervision, allowing the state to achieve an 
immigration policy of its own.170  Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court declared Farmer’s Branch’s ordinance to be 
conflict preempted because its criminal provisions existed outside the federal statutory structure and conflicted 
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with federal anti-harboring laws and the federal authority to arrest and detain persons for possible unlawful 
presence.171  
   
D. Lozano v. City of Hazleton  
 
 In Lozano v. City of Hazleton,172 the Third Circuit examined two city ordinances which were designed 
with a similar structure and aim as the ones analyzed by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits.173  These ordinances 
made legal immigration status a condition to entering into a valid lease and made it “unlawful for any person 
or business entity that [owned] a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien… knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that [the] alien [was] unauthorized.”174  The ordinances defined the term “harboring” to 
include the leasing or renting of a dwelling place to an undocumented immigrant.  They also required landlords 
and tenants to abide by an occupancy license regime conditioned upon the tenant’s proof of legal citizenship 
or residency.175  Any person found in violation of the ordinance’s provisions would be subject to fines and 
possible imprisonment.176  
 
 Although the Third Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit and found the local ordinances preempted by 
federal law, it relied on field preemption in addition to conflict preemption.  The Fifth Circuit understood the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona to mean that the IRCA clearly preempted any attempt by the local 
government to regulate residency of immigrants through the guise of housing regulations.177  It went on to 
hold that the IRCA is centrally concerned with the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the 
subsequent treatment of non-citizens lawfully admitted.178  
 
 The Third Circuit added that the IRCA’s comprehensive scheme plainly precludes state efforts, 
whether harmonious or conflicting, to regulate residence in the U.S. based on immigration status.179  As such, 
although the city’s housing provisions did not control actual physical entry into, or expulsion from, the city or 
the United States, in essence, that is precisely what they attempted to do.180 
 
 The Third Circuit also found the city ordinance to be conflict preempted because the housing 
provisions interfered with the federal government's discretion in, and control over, the removal process.181  
Resting on Arizona, the court found the housing provisions to be inconsistent with federal anti-harboring laws 
because they limited all housing options for undocumented immigrants in the city, constituting a de facto removal 
based on the person’s immigration status.182  
 
 The Third Circuit’s analysis of the Hazleton ordinance also focused on the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of the S.B. 1070 provisions which gave state officers the authority to arrest an individual based on probable 
cause that the individual had committed a removable offense.  Just as the Supreme Court had held in Arizona 
that the referenced provision would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy, which could result 
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in the unnecessary harassment of some non-citizens whom federal officials determined should not be removed, 
so too the City of Hazleton’s provision interfered with the federal immigration scheme, despite the fact that 
the city ordinance applied to all residents.183 
 
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR POTENTIAL RECONCILIATION 
 
A. Preemption As Discrimination 
 
 The three circuit court opinions discussed above make clear the various discriminatory attributes 
involved in ordinances limiting undocumented people’s access to housing.  As this section will argue, the local 
ordinances enacted by the cities of Fremont, Farmers Branch, and Hazelton are quintessential examples of the 
(1) use of race-neutral laws and legal terminology as a proxy for racial discrimination; and (2) the validation or 
rejection of discrimination through a legal discourse of preemption.   
 
1. The Use of Race-Neutral Laws and Legal Terminology as a Proxy for 
Discrimination 
 
In requiring every potential renter to obtain occupancy licenses, the referenced ordinances appear 
facially race-neutral.  Each of these localities’ ordinances purports to establish a licensing scheme aimed at “all” 
interested renters, requiring from “every” potential renter proof of citizenship or legal residency.  By so doing, 
they give a false impression that the scope of their coverage is extendable to all renters in equal terms, when in 
truth their impact is disparately targeting undocumented immigrants.  Specifically, Farmer’s Branch’s ordinance 
intends to apply to every “individual . . . occupying a rented apartment or ‘single-family residence.’”184  In similar 
terms, Hazleton’s housing ordinance is addressed to “any prospective occupant of rental housing over the age of 
eighteen.”185  Fremont’s ordinance uses identical language.186 
 
 This race-neutral language avoids acknowledging that undocumented immigrants will be the only 
individuals who will always fail to meet the ordinance’s proof of citizenship or legal residency requirement.  As 
such, discriminatory intentions are cloaked in over-inclusive categorization efforts, and immigrants of 
underdeveloped countries who do not have the resources necessary to obtain legal residency or citizenship, are 
pushed out of cities and states through a legal discourse impregnated with racial profiling, yet covered in false 
layers of neutrality.  To make matters worse, judicial decisions can solidify such racial discrimination by failing 
to recognize that these race neutral laws structurally propagate racism.  This is the case of the Eight Circuit 
opinion in Keller, where the court dismissed the claim that the ordinance targeted undocumented immigrants 
through race neutral structures.  The court asserted that “[t]he [Fremont] Ordinance require[d] all renters, 
including U.S. citizens and nationals, to obtain an occupancy license before renting a dwelling unit in the 
City.”187  As such, it placed U.S. citizens and undocumented immigrants in the same legal category, despite the 
fact that the Fremont Ordinance disparately impacted the latter. 
 
 On the other hand, the local ordinances under examination adopt a different brand of structural 
determinism when addressing the landlords within the licensing scheme.  By using the phrases “illegal alien” 
and “harboring of an alien” to penalize a landlord’s agreement to rent a dwelling place to an immigrant without 
proof of citizenship or legal residency,188 the local laws create a schism between citizens and undocumented 
immigrants, fostering hostility against foreigners, denying them the basic human right of having shelter, and 
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criminalizing anyone who aids them.  As such, the law uses a pejorative term to categorize the immigrant as an 
unwanted other, excluding them from the local community through unreasonable licensing schemes. 
 
2. The Validation or Rejection of Discrimination through a Legal Discourse of 
Preemption 
  
The ambiguities that plague preemption doctrine can further foster this form of discrimination. As 
noted above, an obvious discrepancy exists between the non-preemptive result arrived at by the Eighth Circuit 
opinion in its analysis of the Fremont ordinance and the Fifth and Third Circuits’ determination that such 
ordinances as enacted by the cities of Farmer’s Branch and Hazleton, were federally preempted.189  This circuit 
split reflects a difference of opinions in the examined circuit court opinions concerning the use of the doctrine 
of preemption to validate or condemn the discriminatory animus artfully veiled in each of these ordinances. 
 
Each ordinance is justified by its legislative authors through protectionist and national security 
arguments, and a “state sovereignty” discourse.  In the case of Fremont, Nebraska, for example, the city 
ordinance enacted by popular referendum, which regulated the housing of undocumented immigrants, was 
specifically grounded in a fear that the growing Hispanic population would increase crime, preclude white 
residents from finding jobs in the traditional meat-packing town, and change the character of the quiet city.190   
 
When the Eighth Circuit examined whether or not the ordinance was federally preempted, it relied on 
the same protectionist argument employed by the city to conclude that the local law was not federally 
preempted.  To do so, the Eight Circuit adopted an approach similar to the Supreme Court’s determination in 
De Canas and Whiting, by relying heavily on the basic presumption that no state law will be held preempted 
unless Congress clearly manifests an intention to do so.  Based on this principle, it concluded that the city 
ordinance was not field preempted because it did not seek to remove an undocumented immigrant from the 
United States, but merely sought to “deter” them from residing in a particular city.  Since the ordinance was 
not tantamount to the removal of an undocumented immigrant –an activity exclusively delegated to the federal 
authorities– the ordinance allegedly did not affect the legal framework established by Congress. To sustain this 
conclusion, the Eight Circuit emphasized that the city had an economic and social interest in deterring 
undocumented immigrants from entering their boundaries in violation of federal law.191  This argument, similar 
to the discourse employed by the advocates of the ordinance, is clearly protectionist in nature, seeking to use 
the principles embedded in the doctrine of preemption –deference to state law in the absence of an express 
Congressional intent to occupy the field– to exclude undocumented immigrants from a particular community, 
all for the sake of the city’s “economic and security” interest.  
 
Comparing the Eighth Circuit’s use of the principles of the doctrine of preemption with the Third and 
Fifth Circuits’ legal analysis, there emerges a potential use of the principle of preemption to hinder 
discrimination, rather than foster it.  For instance, the Hazleton, Pennsylvania mayor justified the ordinance 
regulating the renting of houses by undocumented immigrants on the protectionist basis that the city’s Hispanic 
population, which accounted for forty percent of the residents, was allegedly straining the city’s budget, 
contributing to the rising crime rate, and was changing the character of the city by supposedly adopting 
unhygienic lifestyles. All of this alleged behavior was due to the federal government’s failure to secure the 
United States’ borders and enforce the federal immigration laws.192  When the Third Circuit examined the 
ordinance under the doctrine of preemption, it acknowledged that the city ordinance constituted a de facto 
removal, which was preempted by the federal Supreme Court in Arizona.  Accordingly, the court refused to 
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give deference to a city’s protectionist interests, preferring instead to protect an undocumented immigrant’s 
right to housing, at least until the federal government decides to remove the undocumented immigrant through 
the enforcement of the federal removal procedures.     
 
In Farmer’s Branch, Texas, the case was no different; the “ordinance’s sole purpose was to exclude 
undocumented [immigrants], specifically Latinos, from the” city.193  Nevertheless, the ordinance’s legislative 
intent did not preclude the Fifth Circuit’s decision to rely on Arizona to conclude that the ordinance interfered 
with the federal government’s discretion as to when and how an undocumented immigrant should be removed 
from the United States. Again, the court found that the city ordinance constituted a de facto removal, which left 
the undocumented immigrant with no housing alternatives, since the federal government had not yet decided 
to remove the non-citizen from the United States. 
 In light of the information above, it is evident that how courts apply the doctrine of preemption will 
determine the degree of discrimination that an undocumented immigrant will suffer.  Although certainly the 
Third and Fifth Circuit opinions did not prevent the removal of an undocumented immigrant by the federal 
government, at least they hindered a city’s de facto removal of a non-citizen based on racial profiling shielded by 
protectionist discourse.  Based on this conclusion, and in an effort to provide a doctrinal and non-
discriminatory solution to the analyzed circuit split, the following section will offer a comprehensive federal 
answer to the preemption of state or local government ordinances that prohibit undocumented immigrants 
from renting a dwelling. 
 
B. A Doctrinal And Non-Discriminatory Approach 
 
 As explained above, every preemption inquiry is centrally concerned with whether Congress has 
manifested an express or implied intent that its federal legislation be exclusive in nature, trumping any 
conflicting state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.194  When examining Congress’ preemptive intent, one 
must keep in mind that preemption doctrine requires a clear and manifest expression that Congress wills its 
federal legislation to oust any homologous state law.195  If such a congressional intent is not identified, a 
presumption exists in favor of states exercising their police powers to regulate a determined subject.196 
 
1. Express Preemption Analysis 
 
 As a first step, one must evaluate if such a Congressional intent has been expressly manifested. An 
examination of the IRCA shows that Congress has not established any express statutory provision aimed at 
regulating the conditions or circumstances under which an undocumented immigrant may rent a dwelling.  The 
absence of an express preemptive clause, however, does not foreclose the possibility that the local housing 
ordinances are preempted. 
 
2. Field Preemption Analysis 
 
 The second step of the inquiry requires an examination of whether Congress has impliedly intended 
for the IRCA to preempt the housing ordinances under consideration; in other words, if the state legislation is 
field or conflict preempted.197  Field preemption will exist if a scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as 
to make reasonable the inference that Congress has not permitted the states to supplement it, or where an act 
of Congress touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed 
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to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.198  To aid one’s analysis in determining if the state 
ordinances under examination are field preempted, this Note will apply the four criteria articulated by Professor 
Chemerinsky, which were considered in depth earlier in this Note.199  
 
 The first of these criteria requires courts to examine if the area in controversy is one where the federal 
government traditionally has played a unique role.  In connection to this factor, it is important to observe that 
throughout the three circuit court opinions previously examined, a pattern emerges whereby the local 
ordinances defined “harboring an illegal alien” to include the leasing of a house to an undocumented 
immigrant. 200   This regulatory activity, however, has been an area where the federal government has 
traditionally engaged in significant and pervasive regulation.  
 
 Since 1917, the federal government has manifested a significant role and has provided a comprehensive 
scheme for the regulation and prosecution of those who harbor undocumented immigrants.201  Specifically, the 
IRCA establishes criminal sanctions for any person that knowingly “or in reckless disregard of the fact that an 
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law; conceals, harbors, or shields 
from detection; or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any 
building.” 202   As part of this elaborate scheme, the IRCA imposes civil and criminal penalties for any 
undocumented immigrant who unlawfully enters into the United States.203  Furthermore, Congress has also 
provided criminal penalties against any individual who brings an undocumented immigrant into the United 
States;204 aids the entry of an inadmissible immigrant;205 and imports an immigrant for an immoral purpose.206 
In light of the above, certainly the federal government has clearly expressed more than a “peripheral concern” 
with the entry, movement, and residence of undocumented immigrants within the United States.207 
 
 Professor Chemerinsky next would have courts determine whether Congress has expressed an intent 
in the text of the law or in the legislative history that federal law be exclusive in said area.  Although the IRCA 
does not explicitly foreclose state activity on the subject of undocumented immigrant anti-harboring 
regulations, it does explicitly limit the role that state officers may perform in this field.  Within this complex 
federal immigration framework, Congress has provided that state officers, with the authorization of the federal 
government, can only assist by arresting the individuals who commit these offenses;208 participating in joint 
task-forces with federal officers; providing operational support in executing a warrant; or allowing federal 
immigration officers to gain access to detainees held in state facilities.209  The federal courts, nonetheless, 
maintain exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute for these crimes and interpret the boundaries of the federal 
statute.210  This evinces a textual parameter as to the ambit of activity allowed to the state actors.   
 
                                                 
198 Id. 
199 According to Professor Chemerinsky, a state legislation or local ordinance will be preempted:  (1) if the area in 
controversy is one where the federal government traditionally has played a unique role; (2) if Congress has expressed an 
intent in the text of the law or in the legislative history to have federal law be exclusive in said area; (3) if allowing state 
and local regulations in the area risk interfering with comprehensive federal regulatory efforts; and, (4) if there is an 
important traditional state or local interest served by the law.  Id. 
200 See supra Part II.B-D. 
201 Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1263 n.10 (11th Cir. 2012).  See 
also U.S. v. Alabama, 601 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). 
202 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
203 8 U.S.C. § 1325. 
204 8 U.S.C. § 1324. 
205 8 U.S.C. § 1327. 
206 8 U.S.C. § 1328. 
207 Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, 691 F.3d at 1264. 
208 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c). 
209 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
210 8 U.S.C. § 1329. 
2015 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 143 
 
 Chemerinsky’s third and fourth factors involve the risk of state or local regulation interfering with 
comprehensive federal regulatory efforts and the presence of an important traditional state or local interest in 
regulating the field.  The Court in Arizona established that state officers enforcing local immigration efforts of 
this nature can disrupt and affect the discretion and strategy employed by the federal government in the arrest, 
prosecution and eventual removal of undocumented immigrants.211  Although the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that the Fremont housing ordinance only prohibited harboring conduct that was inconsistent with the city’s 
local economic and security interests,212 such factors are incompatible with the IRCA’s comprehensive scheme, 
which impliedly forecloses state participation beyond the federally supervised efforts as previously explained. 
 In light of the above, and in harmony with the Third and Fifth Circuit Court opinions, this Note’s 
analysis concludes that the local ordinances instituting licensing schemes that criminalize a landlord’s provision 
of a rental lease to an undocumented alien under de facto local anti-harboring statutes, is field preempted by the 
IRCA.   
 
3. Conflict Preemption Analysis 
 
 Having examined the housing ordinances in light of the doctrines of express and field preemption, it is 
necessary to ascertain if these local provisions are conflict preempted; that is, if they stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full congressional purposes and objectives.213 
 
 When one pauses to think about the nature of the housing ordinances in dispute, one must see that 
their functional objective is to drive immigrants out of the cities that have adopted these provisions, by denying 
undocumented immigrants, in practical terms, the ability to rent a dwelling in the regulated area. Although a de 
jure examination only reveals a simple licensing scheme, which on its face is neutrally applicable to all citizens 
interested in renting a dwelling, its underlying objective consists of a local agenda aimed at discriminating 
against undocumented immigrants, by instituting a de facto local government non-citizen removal process. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona provides valuable precedential guidance in making this 
argument.  There, the Supreme Court established that, “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable 
alien to remain present in the United States.”214  The IRCA instructs the federal authorities as to when it is 
advisable for a removal process to be initiated against an undocumented immigrant.215  This decision is highly 
discretionary in nature, and entails the weighing of complicated factors that advise as to when, how, and if 
removal is an advisable decision.216   
 
 Only the federal government, in its constitutional role of interfacing with foreign powers, is capable 
of exercising such discretion.  “A decision on removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate 
to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States.  Decisions of this nature touch on foreign 
relations and must be made with one voice.”217  Accordingly, when state officers and governments institute de 
facto removal procedures that are not authorized, guided or supervised by the federal authorities, the IRCA 
removal scheme is gravely affected.218   
 
 The Eighth Circuit declined to reach such a conclusion by stating that it was too early to declare the 
Fremont rental provisions conflict preempted.219  In the court’s judgment, it was necessary to wait for an as 
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applied challenge to gauge how the state authorities would enforce and interpret its rental provisions.220  This 
conclusion, however, fails to recognize that the local ordinance is facially unconstitutional.  Regardless of how 
a local court interprets its scope in an as applied challenge, its final consequence will be to deny undocumented 
immigrants all possibility of renting a dwelling.  This constitutes a de facto removal procedure, since the non-
citizen will be driven from the city to a location unknown to federal immigration officers.  Hence, the federal 
removal scheme will be upset, and clear Supreme Court constitutional precedents, which establish that the 
removal process is exclusively entrusted to the federal government, will be gravely violated. 
  
In light of the above, the housing ordinances examined by the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits are 
conflict preempted, because they constitute an obstacle to the full congressional purposes and objectives in its 
regulation of the immigration removal procedure.  Moreover, their discriminatory intent leads to a de facto 
removal that affects an undocumented immigrant’s basic human right to adequate housing and upsets a federal 
immigration policy that is designed to weigh complicated factors not considered by the ordinances under 
examination.  Deference to state laws, a state’s interest in protecting its economic and security interests, or the 
sovereignty of local governments, cannot suffice to trump basic preemption principles that entrust the federal 
government with the obligation to coherently coordinate the nation’s removal policy.  Although declaring a 
housing ordinance federally preempted does not guarantee that an undocumented immigrant will not be 
subjected to discriminatory immigration policies, at least it avoids a plethora of local-government immigration 
laws that seek to protect a citizen’s economic and security interest, at the expense of an undocumented 
immigrant’s right to housing.  Accordingly, the framework presented herein constitutes the most balanced 
doctrinal solution to a circuit split that brings to the fore a serious need to reform the United States’ immigration 




 This Note has examined the constitutionality of an ever-increasing wave of local ordinances aimed at 
denying undocumented immigrants basic housing rights.  Through an analysis of a recent circuit split, this Note 
has endeavored to establish that these new local immigration regulations violate the Constitution’s Supremacy 
clause because they impinge on policy areas traditionally reserved for the federal government.  Specifically, this 
Note has strived to establish that, according to the basic principles of the constitutional preemption doctrine, 
these housing ordinances are field and conflict precluded, because they illegitimately aspire to intervene with a 
pervasive federal scheme of anti-harboring regulations, and because they represent an obstacle to the federal 
government’s purposes and objectives in its control of the immigration removal procedure. 
 
 Although state security and economic interests urge local governments to adopt new immigration 
regulations aimed at filling the interstices left by the federal government’s failure to legislate and implement a 
comprehensive immigration policy, such pressures cannot be allowed to result in local immigration policies 
that undermine the United States’ foreign relationships and unnecessarily discriminate against undocumented 
immigrant communities.  Although this Note’s analysis was limited to examining the constitutional validity of 
these housing ordinances in light of the federal Supremacy clause, further studies will have to examine 
legislative, judicial and communitarian alternatives that will adequately balance the concerns and needs of the 
local governments, with the basic rights of undocumented immigrants.  Meanwhile, the federal government 
must aspire to responsibly employ its constitutional competence to regulate the field of immigration, aware 
that the United States is a plural and diverse nation which must accommodate the influx of immigrants and 
foreigners who seek to build a new future on its shores while contributing to its economic, cultural and political 
growth.    
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